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The Clash Between Science and the Law: Can Science Save Nineteen-yearold Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s Life?
Andrea MacIver ....................................................................................... 1
The Supreme Court of the United States has found that youth under the age
of 18 are fundamentally different than adults in ways that impact how they
should be punished for their crimes. In Roper v. Simmons, Graham v.
Florida, and Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court ruled that it is cruel and
unusual punishment to sentence youth under the age of 18 to death, to life
without the possibility of parole for nonhomicide crimes, and to automatic
life without the possibility of parole for homicide crimes (respectively).
However, the underlying scientific studies that the Supreme Court relied on
in making these decisions in Roper, Graham and Miller stand for the
proposition that a youth's brain is not fully developed until his or her mid-tolate twenties—well after the youth celebrates his or her 18th birthday.
This Article analyzes the clash between the Supreme Court's decisions to
draw the line at the age of 18 for the harshest criminal penalties and the
scientific studies that confirm a youth's brain is not fully developed until his
or her mid-to-late twenties. To demonstrate this clash, the Article takes an
in-depth look at the case of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev—the nineteen year old
charged with setting off explosive devices at the finish line of the Boston
Marathon, now facing the death penalty. The Article argues that if the
Supreme Court were to fully recognize the scientific studies that it relied on
in Roper, Graham and Miller, scientific studies that show a youth's brain is
not fully developed until his mid-to-late twenties, that recognition could be
the difference between life and death for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. Although the
Article concludes that Dzhokhar Tsarnaev is not the case where Supreme
Court will come to terms with these underlying scientific studies (given the
severity of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev's crimes), the case of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev
exemplifies a true clash between science and the law.

Two Figures in the Picture: How an Old Legal Practice Might Solve the Puzzle
of Lost Punitive Damages in Legal Malpractice
John M. Bickers ................................................................................... 35
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When lawyers err, clients must pay the price.

If a lawyer’s action, or

inaction, prevents a client from succeeding in a lawsuit, the lawyer must pay
the amount necessary to make the client whole. But what does it mean to
make the client whole? A puzzle appears when a finder of fact in a legal
malpractice case determines that punitive damages in the original lawsuit
were appropriate. Punitive damages are not meant to restore the client to
her original position. By definition, they are meant to punish the original
defendant for the egregiousness of his conduct. The plaintiff receives them
as a response to the lawsuit, but there is no necessary link between the
plaintiff’s injury and the punitive damages.
State courts have responded to this conundrum by categorically awarding
punitive damages or categorically rejecting them. Awarding courts have
focused on the need to make the plaintiff whole; rejecting courts have
emphasized the fact that the attorney’s simple negligence does not compel
the award of punitive damages. Neither decision has any logical primacy.
Indeed, like an optical illusion, one can look at the situation from two
different perspectives and see two different outcomes as logical, or even
compelling.
This article reviews the arguments and counter-arguments about lawyer
malpractice and punitive damages.

It then suggests a policy solution

parallel to that adopted by the medieval law of deodand. That system of
forfeiture of inanimate objects blamed for human deaths had to account for
cases in which the object no longer existed. In those cases, the law focused
on the wrongdoing rather than the injury. In similar fashion, this article
concludes that the best solution to the attorney malpractice and lost punitive
damages problem is to focus on the original wrongdoer, and not transfer
responsibility to the attorney. Doing so leads to the same legal result as that
of the states that categorically reject the transfer of punitive damage awards
to malpracticing attorneys, but with a sounder basis.

The Fourteenth Amendment: A Structural Waiver of State Sovereign Immunity
from Constitutional Tort Suits
Travis Gunn ......................................................................................... 71
The Supreme Court's state sovereign immunity jurisprudence has
undergone a fundamental change. Although the Immunity Theory of the
Eleventh Amendment remains the approved methodology for assessing
a State's sovereign immunity from suit, the modern Court has
transformed state sovereign immunity into a constitutionally-derived
aspect of the States' sovereignty, detached from the Eleventh
Amendment's text. This Article explores what has been overlooked by
other commentators: in detaching state sovereign immunity from the
Eleventh Amendment's text, the modern Court used new analytical tools
to justify the scope of state sovereign immunity. The modern Immunity
Theory now emphasizes constitutional structure and constitutional
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history to establish the boundaries of state sovereign immunity.
This Article uses those analytical tools to determine the extent the
Fourteenth Amendment restricts state sovereign immunity. Ultimately,
this Article will show that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
extinguished a State's sovereign immunity from suit for violating the
substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment – including the
constitutional rights found within that Amendment, and those rights
incorporated against States through the Fourteenth Amendment. This
analysis will also counsel for reading 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as creating a
right of action against States as "persons" for the violation of such
constitutional rights.

Privately Funded Family Medical Leave?
Bernie D. Jones .................................................................................. 119
Upon the twentieth anniversary of the passage of the Family Medical Leave
Act of 1993, activists have been pressed to correct its failure to grant
American workers federally funded paid leave similar to those found in other
nations that offer expansive social programming. Recent developments
indicate, though, that supporters of paid leave might be more successful at
the state level, not the federal one. Nonetheless, federally funded paid leave
is presented as a pressing civil rights issue. In this article, I suggest an
alternative, a property theory of paid family leave, founded upon a newer
formulation of pension benefits: private family leave pensions that might
operate similar to deferred compensation plans, tax deferred or tax free, and
available through employers and brokerage houses. This is about supporting
self-investment-such plans have the potential to offer greater benefits than
even the most generous of the prevailing state government-sponsored paid
leave benefits programs; as such, more thought should be put into
considering alternatives to federally funded paid family medical leave.

The U.C.C. and Perfection Issues Relating to Farm Products
Robert D’Agostino and Bruce G. Luna II........................................... 169
The Uniform Commercial Code (the U.C.C.), first proposed in 1952, is
designed to harmonize the various state laws dealing with commercial
transactions. To date, the U.C.C. has been adopted in all fifty states. Article
9 of the U.C.C. governs the creation of security interests in personal
property that is pledged in exchange for debt. Primarily, Article 9 covers the
creation of an enforceable security interest, referred to as attachment, the
legal process of notification of a security interest to other creditors, known
as perfection, the priority among secured creditors over claims to collateral,
and the secured creditor’s remedies for failure of the debtor to honor its
obligations. Various state laws govern the creation and enforcement of
security interests in farm products, as well as the priority of agricultural
liens. The complex interplay of the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted
among the states, and federal law relating to the perfection and priority of
security interests in agricultural products, has resulted in a variety of
unintended consequences.
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First, the U.C.C.’s Article 9 agricultural lien provisions, primarily the rules
defining farm products and agricultural liens, create some confusion when
determining the U.C.C.’s applicability to agricultural liens when dealing
with secured parties, debtors, and collateral. Second, Article 9’s priority
rules with respect to agricultural liens are subject to state lien statutes.
These state lien statutes, in turn, contain their own priority rules and opt-out
clauses with respect to priority under the U.C.C. In many situations, it is still
unclear whether lien statute priority provisions override Article 9’s priority
rules.
Historically, agricultural liens were created by state legislatures to protect
specific types of creditors. In general terms, agricultural liens are designed
to protect those who supply real estate (e.g., landlords), services (e.g.,
veterinarians), or goods (e.g., feed sellers) on credit to farmers in
furtherance of crop or livestock production. Agricultural liens, similar to
security interests, are designed to give creditors the ability to claim farm
products in order to recoup payment from a defaulting debtor.
Contrary to the purpose of the U.C.C., the failure to include statutory liens
under Article 9 has resulted in a great variance from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction when it comes to matters relating to the creation, enforcement,
perfection, and priority in agricultural liens. Georgia agricultural lien
statutes are often used throughout this Article as examples. This Article
recognizes that the process for the perfection and the establishment of
priority in security interests in farm products is not always clear, because
the current legal regime occasionally results in uncertainty in the perfection
and priority process for the related creditors and debtors. The first part of
this Article will summarize the U.C.C. and federal law framework for
perfecting and enforcing a security interest in agricultural products. The
second part of this Article will analyze the Chapter 12 bankruptcy issues that
result from the definition of farm products and farming operations, the
analysis for when farm products become inventory for purposes of Article 9,
and whether government entitlement payouts to farmer-debtors are
reachable by secured creditors. Next, this Article will examine the issues
facing secured creditors with respect to establishing the priority between
agricultural liens and Article 9 security interests. Finally, this Article will
review the current status of recent cases addressing these issues.

N OTE AND C OMMENT
DNA Real Estate: The Myriad Genetics Case and the Implications of
Granting Patent Eligibility to Complimentary DNA
Sarah E. Hagan ................................................................................. 205
In June 2013, in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et. al., v. Myriad Genetics,
Inc., the Supreme Court examined the patent eligibility of isolated (human)
DNA and it’s components. This was in response to advances in breast cancer
prescreening surrounding mutations associated with the BRCA1 and BRCA2
genes. In accordance with 35 U.S.C. §101, the Court evaluated whether
naturally occurring segments of DNA and synthetically created segments of
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DNA were patent eligible. The Court found that while isolated natural DNA
segments were patent ineligible, synthetically created DNA segments were
not precluded.
This Note examines the potential economic and ethical implications of this
decision and focuses a discussion on why such a ruling may likely prove
contradictory. While the synthetically created DNA evaluated in Myriad,
known as complimentary DNA (cDNA), is in fact synthetic and generated at
the hand of a laboratory technician, arguably the one who holds the patent
on such a component of DNA will therefore be able to exert increased
control over the naturally occurring DNA segment for which the cDNA
serves to compliment.

Shuttered: An Examination of How the 2013 Chicago Public School
Closings are Denying Special Education Students the Right to an
Appropriate Public Education
Michael Toren ....................................................................................... 231
Recently, the Chicago Public School system faced financial crisis as it
struggled to balance severe budget cuts against overwhelming pension
obligations. CPS responded to the crisis by immediately closing forty-nine
elementary schools and terminating the employment of thousands of teachers
and support staff. The displaced students, including many with special needs,
were hastily transferred to surrounding schools without meaningful
evaluation of the impact of the closings or the resources the receiving
schools could provide. After a brief history of the disability rights movement,
special education laws, and the crisis that led to the CPS closings, this
Comment argues that the CPS closings and layoffs harmed special education
students in violation of the federal guarantees provided by the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act. This Comment also advocates for a new
legal burden scheme that would hold school systems more accountable for
changes made to special education programs under IDEA.
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